IPEP Public Opinion Barometer – September–October 2026

The IPEP Public Opinion Barometer, conducted in September–October 2026 among 502 respondents, reveals significant fragmentation in electoral preferences. The Social Democratic Party (PSD) receives 16.5%, the National Liberal Party (PNL) 14.1%, the Save Romania Union (USR) 11.2%, and the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) 10.8%, while a hypothetical political party led by Călin Georgescu attracts 13.1%.

The findings suggest the existence of two distinct electoral constituencies supporting AUR and Călin Georgescu, accounting for a combined 23.9% of respondents.

Television remains the leading source of information (52.4%), followed by online news media (34.5%) and Facebook (30.7%). Meanwhile, the term sovereigntism is predominantly associated with negative perceptions (55.4%), compared with 26.7% positive associations.

The research highlights important differences between political identity, electoral preferences, and public perceptions of national sovereignty.

Introduction

The Institute for Economic and Public Policy (IPEP) presents the findings of its September–October 2026 Public Opinion Barometer, a sociological study designed to examine political preferences, public trust in political figures, and the main concerns of Romanian citizens.

The study explores voting intentions, perceptions of sovereigntism, political orientations, and differences in attitudes across major social and demographic groups.

Through the transparent publication of its data and findings, IPEP seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of Romanian society and to encourage public debate grounded in research, evidence, and verifiable information.

Research Methodology

The study was conducted between September and October 2026, based on a sample of 502 respondents, using a probabilistic, stratified, multistage (cluster) sampling method. The research covered ten territorial units: Dolj, Ilfov, Constanța, Bacău, Iași, Timiș, Mureș, Cluj, Bihor, and the Municipality of Bucharest.

According to the stated methodology, the margin of error is ±4.38 percentage points at a 95% confidence level, subject to the specific effects associated with multistage sampling.

The sample includes both major national centers of economic growth and rural areas characterized by significant socioeconomic disparities. The research seeks to capture differences between urban and rural communities, regions with varying economic and social conditions, and the country’s principal development areas.

Accordingly, the study aims to achieve structural representation across the territories surveyed, without automatically implying statistical representativeness for the entire population of Romania.

Additional Information and Research Partnerships

For further information about the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer, requests for research studies, or opportunities to support the institute’s activities through sponsorship, please contact:

contact@ipep.ro

Methodological Note on Electoral Percentages

In the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer, electoral preference percentages are calculated using the total number of respondents, without excluding undecided voters, individuals who declare that they do not intend to vote, or preferences for smaller political parties.

This approach is intended to ensure a faithful and transparent presentation of the research findings, avoiding the artificial redistribution of percentages among the major political parties.

Academic research highlights that proportionally reallocating undecided voters can introduce errors into electoral estimates. Undecided respondents constitute a distinct group, with their own characteristics and electoral behavior, and their eventual preferences do not necessarily follow the distribution of choices already expressed by decided voters.

Consequently, IPEP presents the unadjusted results of the survey, preserving all response categories separately and avoiding the transformation of observed data into hypothetical estimates of valid votes cast.

Geographical Limitations and the Interpretation of UDMR Support

The IPEP survey did not include localities in areas with predominantly ethnic Hungarian populations, particularly in Harghita and Covasna counties, where the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) traditionally enjoys substantial electoral support.

Consequently, the percentage recorded for UDMR in this research should not be interpreted as an estimate of the party’s national electoral support.

This geographical limitation must also be considered when interpreting the results for other political parties, since electoral preferences in areas excluded from the survey may influence their relative shares at the national level.

For comparison, UDMR received 6.33% of the valid votes cast nationwide in the parliamentary elections held on December 1, 2024. The exclusion of predominantly ethnic Hungarian areas from the IPEP survey provides important context for understanding the lower percentage recorded in the present study.

The Institute for Economic and Public Policy (IPEP) emphasizes that it publishes the original research findings without adjusting or redistributing the recorded percentages.

Voting Intentions in Parliamentary Elections

The results of the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer for September–October 2026 reveal a fragmented distribution of electoral preferences, with no political party exceeding 20% of the total sample.

The Social Democratic Party (PSD) receives 16.5%, followed by the National Liberal Party (PNL) with 14.1%, a hypothetical party led by Călin Georgescu with 13.1%, the Save Romania Union (USR) with 11.2%, and the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) with 10.8%. Meanwhile, 5.6% of respondents state that they would support independent candidates, while other political parties record smaller individual shares.

An important finding is that 18.1% of respondents declare that they would not participate in the elections. The results therefore highlight both the fragmentation of political preferences and the existence of a substantial segment of respondents who do not intend to vote.

All percentages are calculated using the total number of respondents, without reallocating the responses of those who do not intend to vote or have not expressed a clear political preference.

Nearly half of respondents, 45.8%, do not indicate a currently represented parliamentary party as their preferred electoral option. This category includes supporters of political alternatives as well as individuals who declare that they will not vote or have not expressed a clear preference. Consequently, this percentage should not be interpreted entirely as a rejection of parliamentary parties.

Methodological note: In the voting intention tables, the category “Will not vote / Undecided / No response / Other answers” combines respondents who declare that they will not participate in the elections (18.1%) with those who have not expressed a clear electoral preference or have provided other responses (4.2%).

The combined figure of 22.3% therefore does not represent electoral abstention alone. These categories are grouped for presentation purposes without altering the underlying research results.

For a clearer understanding of the findings, the same voting intention data are presented below in an alternative graphical format, without changing the recorded percentages.

The following table examines differences in electoral preferences between respondents living in urban and rural areas. Percentages are calculated separately for each electoral option, allowing a comparison of the geographical composition of the various voter groups.

Urban–Rural Distribution of Electoral Preferences

The following table highlights differences in the geographical composition of electoral constituencies across urban and rural areas. Percentages are calculated separately for each electoral preference, allowing an assessment of the proportion of each party’s supporters residing in urban and rural communities.

The urban–rural distribution reveals important differences in the composition of electoral constituencies. Among USR supporters, 80.4% reside in urban areas, while the electorates of PSD, PNL, AUR, and Călin Georgescu’s hypothetical party exhibit relatively balanced distributions between urban and rural communities.

By contrast, 78.6% of respondents supporting independent candidates live in urban areas, while 75.0% of those supporting smaller political parties, each receiving less than 5% of voting preferences, reside in towns and cities.

These findings highlight differences in the geographical composition of electoral groups within the surveyed sample. However, the percentages should not be interpreted as the share of urban or rural residents who would vote for a particular party, since each row is calculated using the total number of respondents supporting that electoral option.

An analysis by age group provides further insight into generational differences among the supporters of Romania’s main political parties. The following table presents the age composition of each electoral constituency, distinguishing between five age categories.

Age Distribution of Electoral Preferences

An analysis by age group helps identify generational differences among supporters of Romania’s main political parties, highlighting the age composition of each electoral constituency.

The following table presents five age categories: 18–25, 26–39, 40–55, 56–65, and over 65 years. Percentages are calculated separately for each electoral option, allowing comparisons between the age profiles of different political constituencies.

Within the IPEP sample, USR has a substantial concentration of supporters in the 26–39 age group (46.4%), while PSD and PNL display more balanced age distributions, with significant proportions of supporters aged over 40.

AUR supporters are distributed relatively evenly across the five age categories. Meanwhile, Călin Georgescu’s hypothetical party has approximately one-third of its supporters in each of the 26–39 and 40–55 age groups (33.3% each).

These differences describe the age composition of respondents within the surveyed sample and should not be interpreted as statistically representative estimates for the entire Romanian population.

Educational attainment is another important factor in the analysis of electoral preferences. The following table presents the educational composition of each party’s supporters, based on the highest level of education completed, distinguishing between primary or lower education, secondary education, and higher education.

Educational Attainment and Electoral Preferences

Educational attainment represents another important dimension in the analysis of electoral preferences. The following table presents the educational composition of respondents supporting each political party or electoral option, based on their highest level of completed education.

The analysis distinguishes between primary or lower education, secondary education, and higher education, while separately identifying respondents who did not specify their educational attainment.

Percentages are calculated within each electoral group, allowing comparisons of the educational profiles of different political constituencies.

The IPEP Public Opinion Barometer reveals important differences in the educational composition of electoral constituencies. Among USR supporters, 73.2% have completed higher education, compared with 67.9% among supporters of independent candidates and 57.7% among PNL supporters.

By contrast, secondary education is the most common educational level among PSD supporters (57.8%), while AUR displays a relatively balanced distribution between respondents with secondary education (46.3%) and those with higher education (48.1%).

Among respondents supporting Călin Georgescu’s hypothetical political party, 51.5% have completed secondary education, while 34.8% have higher education qualifications.

These findings describe the educational composition of respondents supporting each electoral option within the surveyed sample. They do not establish that educational attainment determines political preferences.

To further examine the relationship between educational attainment and political preferences, the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer separately analyzed voting intentions among respondents with higher education qualifications.

The following table presents the distribution of electoral preferences within this educational group, including support for independent candidates and respondents who declare that they do not intend to vote.

To further examine the relationship between educational attainment and political preferences, the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer separately analyzed voting intentions among respondents with higher education qualifications.

The following table presents the distribution of electoral preferences within this educational group, including support for independent candidates and respondents who declare that they do not intend to vote.

Among respondents with higher education, PNL and USR each receive 18.2% of electoral preferences, followed by PSD with 12.4%, AUR with 11.6%, and Călin Georgescu’s hypothetical party with 10.2%.

At the same time, 11.6% of respondents in this educational category declare that they would not participate in the elections, while 8.4% express a preference for independent candidates.

These findings reveal a fragmented distribution of electoral preferences among respondents with higher education. Neither of the two most frequently mentioned parties accounts for one-fifth of this subgroup, while political alternatives and non-participation represent substantial shares.

The percentages describe the preferences of the 225 respondents with higher education included in the IPEP sample and should not be generalized automatically to all university graduates in Romania.

Gender represents another dimension of electoral analysis. The following table examines the proportion of women and men among the supporters of each political party or electoral option.

Percentages are calculated separately within each electoral constituency, with each row totaling approximately 100%. This allows comparisons of the gender composition of different political groups.

Gender Distribution of Electoral Preferences

The gender distribution of electoral preferences reveals differences in the composition of the main political constituencies. Each electoral option is analyzed separately, with percentages calculated within the respective group of supporters.

The following table presents the proportion of women and men among respondents supporting each political party or electoral option, including independent candidates, smaller parties, and respondents who do not express a clear voting preference.

Within the IPEP sample, men account for 61.4% of PSD supporters and 55.6% of AUR supporters, while women represent 57.6% of respondents supporting Călin Georgescu’s hypothetical political party.

PNL displays an almost equal gender distribution, with 50.7% women and 49.3% men, while USR has a slight female majority, at 53.6%.

Among respondents supporting independent candidates, women represent 64.3%, while their share reaches 68.8% among supporters of smaller political parties.

These differences describe the gender composition of each electoral constituency within the surveyed sample. They should not be interpreted as the proportion of all women or men who would vote for a particular political party.

To further examine gender differences in political preferences, the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer separately analyzed voting intentions among women and men.

The following table presents the electoral preferences of the 261 female and 241 male respondents, including support for the main political parties and other electoral options. Percentages are calculated separately within each gender group, allowing direct comparisons between women’s and men’s voting intentions.

Voting Intentions Among Women and Men

To highlight differences in electoral preferences between women and men, the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer separately examined voting intentions within each gender group.

The following table presents support for the main political parties, including a hypothetical party led by Călin Georgescu, alongside other electoral options. The analysis is based on 261 female and 241 male respondents, with percentages calculated separately for each group.

This approach allows direct comparisons of women’s and men’s voting preferences rather than simply describing the gender composition of each political party’s electorate.

The IPEP Public Opinion Barometer reveals notable differences in voting intentions between women and men.

Among female respondents, 19.5% declare that they do not intend to vote, while the hypothetical party led by Călin Georgescu is the most frequently selected individual political party, receiving 14.6%. PNL follows with 13.8%, PSD with 12.3%, USR with 11.5%, and AUR with 9.2%.

Among male respondents, PSD receives 21.2%, compared with 12.3% among women. PNL is supported by 14.5% of men, AUR by 12.4%, Călin Georgescu’s hypothetical party by 11.6%, and USR by 10.8%.

The hypothetical party led by Călin Georgescu therefore records a higher share among women than among men, while PSD and AUR have higher levels of support among male respondents. PNL and USR show comparatively smaller differences between the two gender groups.

Overall, 38.7% of women and 29.5% of men fall into the combined “Other Options” category, which includes smaller parties, independent candidates, non-voters, and respondents without a clearly stated electoral preference.

These results describe gender differences within the surveyed sample and should not be automatically generalized to the entire Romanian electorate.

Nearly half of respondents in the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer, 45.8%, do not indicate a currently represented parliamentary party as their preferred electoral option.

Women account for 58.3% of this group, compared with 41.7% men, while its urban–rural distribution is almost identical to that of the overall sample. Approximately half of these respondents have completed secondary education, and 38.3% hold higher education qualifications.

An important finding concerns perceptions of the country’s direction: 90.9% of respondents in this group believe Romania is heading in the wrong direction.

These results suggest an association between the absence of support for currently represented parliamentary parties and dissatisfaction with the country’s development. However, the findings do not establish that dissatisfaction is the primary cause of respondents’ electoral preferences.

The results of the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer for September–October 2026 reveal a predominantly negative perception of Romania’s direction.

83.1% of respondents believe that the country is heading in the wrong direction, while only 16.1% consider its direction to be generally positive. The proportion of respondents who did not express an opinion is just 0.8%.

These findings indicate a high level of dissatisfaction among the individuals surveyed, extending across different electoral preference groups.

The IPEP Public Opinion Barometer indicates that negative perceptions of Romania’s direction are prevalent across all the electoral preference groups examined.

Among AUR supporters, 96.3% believe that Romania is heading in the wrong direction, compared with 88.0% among PSD supporters, 62.5% among USR supporters, and 57.7% among PNL supporters.

Among respondents grouped under the remaining electoral options, including non-voters and those without a clear preference, 90.9% express a negative assessment of the country’s direction.

These findings show that dissatisfaction with Romania’s current trajectory is not confined to supporters of opposition parties. Negative perceptions are also present among respondents who support parties participating in government.

The results describe an association between electoral preferences and perceptions of the country’s direction, without establishing a direct causal relationship between the two.

In addition to perceptions of the country’s direction, the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer examined public trust in six prominent Romanian political figures.

The following section presents the distribution of responses across five categories: high trust, low trust, no trust, unfamiliarity with the political figure, and don’t know or no answer. The results provide an overview of both trust and distrust within the surveyed sample.

Public Trust in Political Figures

How much trust do you have in the following political figures? (Please answer only for those you have heard of.)

The results of the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer reveal substantial differences in levels of trust among the six political figures examined.

Călin Georgescu records the highest proportion of respondents expressing a high level of trust, at 27.9%, followed by Ilie Bolojan at 19.5% and George Simion at 16.3%.

Among the remaining political figures, 11.6% of respondents report a high level of trust in Sorin Grindeanu, 11.2% in Dominic Fritz, and 7.2% in Nicușor Dan.

The following table presents the complete distribution of responses, distinguishing between high trust, low trust, no trust at all, unfamiliarity with the political figure, and non-responses.

The IPEP Public Opinion Barometer reveals particularly high levels of distrust in the six political figures examined.

Nicușor Dan records the highest proportion of respondents expressing no trust at all, at 60.8%, followed by George Simion at 58.8% and Ilie Bolojan at 57.0%.

Sorin Grindeanu and Călin Georgescu each record 54.4% in the same category, while Dominic Fritz has 50.8%.

Consequently, more than half of respondents express no trust at all in every one of the six political figures.

These findings highlight the extent of political distrust within the surveyed sample, including towards figures who receive substantial support from particular electoral constituencies.

To further explore the relationship between electoral preferences and public trust, the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer examines which political figures receive the highest levels of trust within the electorates of the main political parties.

The following analysis identifies the most frequently trusted and distrusted political figures among supporters of PSD, PNL, USR, AUR, and Călin Georgescu’s hypothetical political party.

Political Trust and Distrust by Electoral Constituency

To examine the relationship between electoral preferences and public trust in political figures, the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer identifies which of the six political figures evaluated receives the highest proportion of “High Trust” responses within each major electoral constituency.

The analysis also identifies the political figure receiving the highest proportion of “No Trust at All” responses among supporters of each party.

Percentages are calculated separately within each electoral constituency, allowing comparisons of political attitudes among supporters of PSD, PNL, USR, AUR, and Călin Georgescu’s hypothetical political party.

The results reveal significant differences in the distribution of political trust across electoral constituencies.

Among PSD supporters, 54.2% express high trust in Sorin Grindeanu, while 67.6% of PNL supporters report high trust in Ilie Bolojan. Within the USR electorate, Dominic Fritz receives high trust from 57.1% of respondents.

An important finding concerns AUR supporters, among whom George Simion and Călin Georgescu each receive 59.3% of “High Trust” responses. This indicates that both political figures enjoy substantial confidence within the AUR electorate represented in the sample.

By contrast, 95.5% of respondents supporting Călin Georgescu’s hypothetical political party express high trust in Georgescu himself.

These results highlight the relationship between electoral preferences and confidence in political figures. However, the percentages do not establish that trust in an individual is the sole reason for supporting a particular party.

The IPEP Public Opinion Barometer reveals that the political figure receiving the highest proportion of “No Trust at All” responses differs across electoral constituencies.

Among PSD supporters, Dominic Fritz records the highest level of complete distrust, at 73.5%. Among PNL supporters, George Simion receives the highest proportion of such responses, at 88.7%, while 91.1% of USR supporters report no trust at all in Călin Georgescu.

A notable similarity emerges between the electorates of AUR and Călin Georgescu’s hypothetical political party. In both groups, Ilie Bolojan receives the highest proportion of “No Trust at All” responses, reaching 90.7% among AUR supporters and 89.4% among supporters of Georgescu’s hypothetical party.

These findings demonstrate substantial differences in political distrust across electoral constituencies. They also identify similarities between certain groups, although such similarities do not necessarily imply identical political preferences, motivations, or ideological positions.

The IPEP Public Opinion Barometer also identifies differences in political trust between urban and rural respondents.

Among respondents living in urban areas, Ilie Bolojan receives the highest proportion of “High Trust” responses, at 22.0%. By contrast, among respondents living in rural areas, Călin Georgescu records the highest proportion, at 37.2%.

These findings indicate differences in the geographical distribution of trust within the surveyed sample, without establishing that residential environment determines political attitudes.

Public Perceptions of Sovereigntism

What is the first word that comes to mind when you hear the terms “sovereigntism” or “sovereigntist movement”?

The IPEP Public Opinion Barometer examines the associations respondents make with the concept of sovereigntism through an open-ended question designed to capture their immediate perceptions.

The findings reveal a predominantly negative perception of the term. 55.4% of respondents express negative associations, including words such as “extremism,” “stupidity,” “scandal,” and “distrust.”

By contrast, 26.7% express positive associations, referring to ideas such as “patriotism,” “hope,” “independence,” and “justice.” The remaining 17.9% provide neutral, descriptive, or ambiguous answers without a clearly identifiable positive or negative evaluation.

The following table presents the distribution of responses according to their interpreted sentiment.

These findings suggest that, among respondents surveyed, the term “sovereigntism” is more frequently associated with negative perceptions than with positive values.

The responses may reflect public reactions to the political movements and figures commonly identified with sovereigntism, rather than opposition to the principle of national sovereignty itself.

However, the open-ended question does not establish this distinction conclusively. The results primarily demonstrate that the term carries substantial negative associations within the surveyed sample.

As the categories were derived from the interpretation of open-ended responses, the classification should be understood as a qualitative coding exercise rather than a direct choice between predefined positive and negative answers.

The IPEP Public Opinion Barometer reveals substantial differences in perceptions of sovereigntism across electoral constituencies.

Negative associations are particularly frequent among USR supporters (85.7%), followed by PNL supporters (77.5%) and PSD supporters (66.3%).

By contrast, negative associations are expressed by 18.5% of AUR supporters and 10.6% of respondents who would vote for a hypothetical political party led by Călin Georgescu.

These findings indicate pronounced differences in how the term “sovereigntism” is perceived across electoral groups. However, they do not establish that political preferences directly determine these perceptions.

The findings also underline the importance of distinguishing between respondents’ reactions to a political label and their views on the underlying concept of national sovereignty.

Negative Associations with Sovereigntism (55.4%)

The most frequently mentioned negative associations are “extremism” and “extremists,” with 16 combined occurrences, followed by “stupidity” and “fools” (10), “scandal” and “troublemakers” (9), “thieves” and “theft” (8), “communism” and “communists” (7), “distrust” (6), “fake” and “fraudulent” (6), “danger” and “dangerous” (5), “bad” and “bad people” (5), and “lies” and “liars” (4).

These associations indicate that negative perceptions are primarily related to concerns about extremism, public behavior, lack of trust, and the perceived credibility of individuals identified with the sovereigntist movement.

The findings suggest that respondents’ negative reactions may concern not only political ideas but also the behavior and public image of those associated with the movement. Nevertheless, the responses do not allow these explanations to be distinguished with certainty.

Positive Associations with Sovereigntism (26.7%)

The most frequently mentioned positive associations are “patriotism,” “patriot,” and “patriots,” with 15 combined occurrences, followed by “hope” (11), “independence” and “independent” (7), “justice” (6), “future” (5), “freedom” (3), “determination” (3), “normality” (3), “change” (3), “fighters” (3), “courage” and “courageous” (3), and “opportunity” (3).

These responses highlight favorable associations between sovereigntism and patriotism, national independence, hope for a better future, and a desire for political or social change.

For respondents expressing positive associations, sovereigntism may therefore represent ideas related to national identity, self-determination, political renewal, and the protection of collective interests.

Overall, the findings demonstrate that the term evokes substantially different meanings among respondents, reflecting both positive aspirations and negative perceptions of the political movements associated with it.

The distinction between perceptions of sovereigntism and attitudes toward national sovereignty becomes particularly relevant when respondents are asked to choose between competing political priorities.

The following section examines whether respondents consider defending Romania’s independence and national resources more urgent than suspending President Nicușor Dan.

It also analyzes the preferences of respondents who associate the term “sovereigntism” with negative meanings, allowing a comparison between attitudes toward a political movement and support for the principles of national sovereignty.

What Is More Urgent? National Sovereignty or Presidential Suspension?

Through this question, the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer examines how respondents establish their priorities when asked to choose between two different political objectives: defending Romania’s national independence and resources, even in the event of disagreements with decisions made by the European Union, and suspending President Nicușor Dan from office.

Beyond electoral preferences and perceptions of political movements, the responses provide insight into the importance respondents attach to national sovereignty, national interests, and the protection of Romania’s resources.

Importantly, choosing one priority does not necessarily imply opposition to the other. The question measures respondents’ relative preferences between two proposed objectives rather than their overall support for either principle

The results of the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer indicate that 59.2% of respondents prioritize defending Romania’s national independence and resources, even in the event of disagreements with decisions made by EU institutions.

By comparison, 32.3% select the suspension of President Nicușor Dan as the more urgent objective, while 8.6% do not express a preference.

These findings suggest that concern for national sovereignty and resources extends beyond specific electoral constituencies and should not automatically be equated with support for parties identifying themselves as sovereigntist.

However, since respondents were asked to choose between two different priorities, the findings should not be interpreted as a direct measure of patriotism, general attitudes toward the European Union, or overall support for presidential suspension.

An important cross-tabulation in the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer reveals that 62.6% of respondents who associate the term “sovereigntism” with negative meanings nevertheless prioritize defending Romania’s national independence and resources, even in the event of disagreements with European Union institutions.

By comparison, 25.9% of respondents in this group consider suspending President Nicușor Dan the more urgent objective, while 11.5% do not express a preference.

This distinction suggests that negative perceptions of sovereigntism, whether understood as a political label or as a political movement, do not necessarily imply opposition to the principle of national sovereignty.

For a substantial proportion of these respondents, defending Romania’s independence and resources remains an important priority, even when the term “sovereigntism” evokes negative associations.

Nevertheless, the question measured a choice between two competing priorities rather than respondents’ level of patriotism or their overall attitudes toward the European Union.

The results of the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer show that respondents who support the suspension of President Nicușor Dan come from several different electoral constituencies.

Among those who selected presidential suspension as the more urgent priority, 22.8% would vote for a hypothetical party led by Călin Georgescu, while 19.1% declare that they would not participate in parliamentary elections.

PSD and AUR each account for 15.4% of this group, followed by PNL with 8.0% and USR with 5.6%.

Smaller political parties account for 4.9%, independent candidates for 1.9%, and respondents without a clear electoral preference or providing other answers for 6.8%.

These findings indicate that support for presidential suspension is not confined to the electorate of a single political party. Respondents who select this priority include supporters of parties both within and outside the governing political landscape.

The results describe the electoral composition of respondents supporting suspension. They do not establish that the same proportion of each party’s supporters favors such an initiative.

Perceptions of Potential Political Partnerships Involving AUR

Beyond electoral preferences and political priorities, the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer also examines how respondents perceive potential relationships between the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) and Romania’s established political parties.

The following section investigates whether respondents associate AUR more closely with a potential political partnership involving the Social Democratic Party (PSD) or the National Liberal Party (PNL).

The analysis distinguishes between the perceptions expressed by the entire sample and those expressed specifically by supporters of AUR and Călin Georgescu’s hypothetical political party.

Perceptions of Potential Political Partnerships Involving AUR

Which of the following two statements do you agree with more?

To understand how respondents perceive relationships between Romania’s main political parties, the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer examined the potential political alignment of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) with the country’s established parties.

Respondents were asked whether they associated AUR more closely with a potential political partnership involving the Social Democratic Party (PSD) or the National Liberal Party (PNL).

The results measure perceptions of possible political cooperation, rather than support for such a partnership or evidence that an agreement exists between the parties

The results of the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer show that 76.1% of respondents associate AUR more closely with a potential political partnership involving PSD, compared with 12.5% who associate it with PNL.

A further 11.4% do not express a preference between the two alternatives.

The substantial difference between these responses suggests that, within the surveyed sample, AUR is predominantly perceived as being closer to a possible political partnership with PSD than with PNL.

However, this perception does not constitute evidence of an existing agreement between AUR and PSD, nor does it establish that respondents support such a partnership.

The findings describe how participants perceive possible political relationships, rather than the actual intentions or decisions of the parties concerned.

Among respondents who would vote for AUR or a hypothetical political party led by Călin Georgescu, 81.7% perceive AUR as being closer to a possible political partnership with PSD, while only 10.8% associate it with PNL. A further 7.5% do not express an opinion.

These findings indicate that the perception of a potential AUR–PSD partnership is also prevalent among supporters of AUR and Călin Georgescu’s hypothetical political party.

However, this does not necessarily mean that respondents favor such an alliance. The question measures perceptions of potential political cooperation rather than approval of a partnership.

The results should also be interpreted in light of the subgroup’s size, which comprises 120 respondents from the two combined electoral constituencies.

Sources of Information About Politics and National News

Which sources do you use most frequently to obtain information about politics and national news? (Select a maximum of TWO options.)

To understand how citizens form their political opinions, the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer examined the main sources of information used by respondents.

The analysis considers the role of television, online news outlets, social media platforms, and interpersonal discussions in accessing political and national news.

Each respondent could select up to two sources of information. Consequently, the percentages presented in the following tables may add up to more than 100%.

Sources of Information About Politics and National News

Which sources do you use most frequently to obtain information about politics and national news? (Select a maximum of TWO options.)

To understand how citizens form their political opinions, the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer examined the main sources of information used by respondents.

The research focused on the role of television, online news outlets, social media platforms, and direct conversations in providing access to political and national news.

Each respondent could select up to two sources of information. Consequently, the sum of the percentages may exceed 100%

The results of the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer show that television remains the most frequently mentioned source of political information, selected by 52.4% of respondents.

It is followed by online news outlets, at 34.5%, and Facebook, at 30.7%. Direct conversations with family members, friends, or colleagues are also an important source of information, mentioned by 27.9% of participants, while TikTok is selected by 19.9%.

These findings highlight the coexistence of traditional news channels and digital platforms, as well as the continued importance of interpersonal communication in the formation of political opinions.

Because respondents could select up to two sources, the percentages indicate how frequently each source was mentioned, rather than mutually exclusive categories of media consumption.

The IPEP Public Opinion Barometer reveals differences in information habits across the main electoral constituencies.

Television is the most frequently mentioned source among PSD supporters (73.5%), AUR supporters (59.3%), and PNL supporters (56.3%).

By contrast, online news outlets are the most frequently selected source among USR supporters (66.1%), followed by direct conversations (32.1%) and Facebook (23.2%).

A different pattern emerges among respondents who would support a hypothetical political party led by Călin Georgescu. TikTok is their most frequently mentioned information source (48.5%), followed by television (36.4%) and Facebook (34.8%).

These findings highlight differences in the information habits of electoral constituencies, without demonstrating that the use of any particular platform determines political preferences.

How Would You Assess Your Household’s Combined Income?

The economic circumstances of households provide an important indicator of living standards and the financial difficulties experienced by respondents.

To assess the extent to which household income covers basic needs and allows for savings, the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer asked respondents to evaluate their family’s combined income.

The following table distinguishes between households unable to cover essential expenses, those able to meet only basic needs, those enjoying a reasonable standard of living but with limited purchasing power, and those able to save money or purchase valuable goods.

The results show that 42.2% of respondents experience financial difficulties, with their household income either insufficient to cover basic necessities or sufficient only to meet essential needs.

At the same time, 44.6% report enjoying a decent standard of living, although their purchasing power remains limited when it comes to expensive goods.

Only 12.4% state that they are able to save money or purchase valuable goods.

10 Key Findings of the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer

September–October 2026

The following section summarizes the ten main findings of the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer, covering public dissatisfaction with Romania’s direction, electoral preferences, political trust, perceptions of sovereigntism, political partnerships, information sources, and household living standards.

The findings describe the responses collected from the 502 participants in the surveyed territories and should not automatically be generalized to Romania’s entire population.

10 Key Findings of the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer

September–October 2026

1. Widespread dissatisfaction with the country’s direction

83.1% of respondents believe Romania is heading in the wrong direction, compared with 16.1% who view its direction positively.

2. Fragmented political preferences and significant declared non-participation

18.1% would not vote. PSD receives 16.5%, PNL 14.1%, Călin Georgescu’s hypothetical party 13.1%, USR 11.2%, and AUR 10.8%.

3. AUR and Călin Georgescu’s hypothetical party represent distinct electoral options

Together, these options account for 23.9%; AUR alone receives 10.8%. Support for Georgescu cannot automatically be transferred to AUR.

4. Distrust of political figures is widespread

More than half express no trust in any of the six figures. Nicușor Dan records 60.8%, George Simion 58.8%, and Ilie Bolojan 57.0%. Călin Georgescu receives 27.9% high trust but 54.4% no trust.

5. The term “sovereigntism” predominantly evokes negative associations

Open-ended responses were classified as 55.4% negative, 26.7% positive, and 17.9% neutral or ambiguous.

6. Rejecting the term “sovereigntism” does not necessarily mean rejecting national sovereignty

Among respondents expressing negative associations, 62.6% nevertheless prioritize defending Romania’s independence and resources over presidential suspension.

7. AUR is perceived as closer to PSD than to PNL

76.1% associate AUR with a potential PSD partnership, compared with 12.5% for PNL. Among AUR and Georgescu supporters, 81.7% select PSD. This reflects perception, not a confirmed alliance.

8. Age, gender, and education are associated with electoral differences

Among university graduates, PNL and USR each receive 18.2%. PSD receives 21.2% among men versus 12.3% among women; Georgescu’s hypothetical party receives 14.6% among women versus 11.6% among men.

9. Television remains the main source of political information

Television is mentioned by 52.4%, online news by 34.5%, and Facebook by 30.7%. USR supporters most frequently mention online news (66.1%), while Georgescu supporters most frequently mention TikTok (48.5%).

10. Economic difficulties affect a substantial proportion of respondents

42.2% report income insufficient for more than basic necessities. Another 44.6% describe a decent but financially limited standard of living. Only 12.4% can save or purchase valuable goods.

General Summary

The IPEP Public Opinion Barometer highlights widespread dissatisfaction with Romania’s direction, low levels of trust in political figures, and fragmented electoral preferences among the respondents surveyed. At the same time, concern for national independence and the protection of Romania’s resources can exist independently of sympathy for political parties identifying themselves as sovereigntist.

Differences between electoral constituencies are associated with social characteristics, educational attainment, and sources of information. The research also highlights the importance of household economic circumstances and public trust.

Source: IPEP Public Opinion Barometer, September–October 2026. Sample: 502 respondents.

The findings describe the surveyed sample and should not automatically be generalized to Romania’s entire population. The classification of open-ended responses concerning sovereigntism involved interpretive coding.

Additional Information and Research Partnerships

For further information about the IPEP Public Opinion Barometer, requests for studies and research, or opportunities to support the institute’s activities through sponsorships, please contact us.

Institute for Economic and Public Policies (IPEP)

Email: contact@ipep.ro